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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHELLING.

IN many respects Schelling is a philosopher who cannot be said to have come to his own. Standing between Fichte and Hegel, his characteristic blendings of poetry and science, philosophy and mythology — which made him philosophic center and focus of Romanticism — caused him to be often regarded more as romancer than as seriously constructive philosopher. Unlike Fichte, whose preponderating influence was man, Schelling laid stress upon the world, carrying over into it his wavering subjectivity and his bold phantasy. It was for Schelling an “immediate certainty” that “there exist things outside of us”; and nature formed for him “the sum of all that is purely objective in our knowledge.”

Recent idealistic speculation has laid its beginnings so strongly in subjectivity, that it has been needfully reminded by the New Realism of our time of the significance of aspects like this Schellingian one, wherein the world appears as a datum rather than as a construction. Even if we do not finally rest in Realism, it is necessary to do more justice to objectivity than it has idealistically received. Schelling, for all his hold on objectivity, had an imposing, speculative construction.

The world was to Fichte as self-consciousness erects it; but the self which builds it was to the Romanticists the self of genius — of the constructive artist — and the real world is the world that satisfies such geniuses. Schelling is the most genial of the three speculative thinkers whom we have named, for his ideal of man is just this genial and creative individuality — not, as with Fichte, moral will or character. The Romanticists preferred, to the ethical idealism of Fichte, the less severe mode of interpreting nature, idealistically, in terms of bold statement and striking divination. For Schelling, the greatest problem was the determination of the relationship between nature and mind, between the unconscious and the conscious.

A true metaphysic of nature is a thing of such prime philo-

sophic concern, that it cannot but appear strange that Schelling's philosophy of nature has never received the attention it deserves. To him nature, as unconscious expression of spirit, is visible spirit, and spirit is invisible nature. The absolute intelligence is taken by him as not only giving rise to ideal conceptions, but as creative of the real world. Between such a method as Schelling's of constructing reality from an advancing thought-process, and the intuition on which he insists, there is an inherent contradiction. For him, there was the same Absolute in nature as in mind, their harmony being no mere reflection of thought. If you suppose we transfer our idea to nature, then, holds Schelling, you have not even dreamed what nature is and should be for us. Nature is the counterpart of mind, and produced by it, only that mind may, by its agency, attain to self-consciousness or a pure perception of itself.

"The attempt," according to Schelling, "to account for nature as a production adapted to design, that is, realizing a purpose, destroys the character of nature, and, in fact, the very thing which constitutes it nature. For the peculiarity of nature consists in this, that while its mechanism is blind, it is in that mechanism, nevertheless, adapted to a design. If we destroy that mechanism, we also destroy nature itself." It was indeed this thought of nature's life and action, as constitutive of existent reason, that Hegel expanded into the statement that all that is real or actual is rational. The real thing, to Schelling, is the idea; the idea is the substance — the heart of things; finite existence is a merely derived being, and, loosed from the idea, has no reality. Existence must, in his view, be thought of as substance.

Schelling derives largely from Spinoza, the net result not being Spinozan substance, with matter and mind as inseparable attributes of one being, but an inconceivable background of real being named the Absolute. But Schelling's conception of God is not a simple one, but consists of several, which together sum his inner development. The God-problem occupied him but little at first, God being to him then the world-creating, absolute I, standing in sharpest contrast to the empiric ego of man,

which latter exists only through this absolute I. For him the unity of consciousness—in other words, personality—is found only in the finite ego. The infinite ego has no object; neither has it unity of consciousness nor personality. Schelling is still one with Spinoza, but he comes to think differently later. Other stages into which he passed are, periods of interest in the philosophy of nature, and in transcendental idealism.

The mistake of Schelling was to give his idealism an absolute cast, whereby the Idea, as a universal principle of explanation, should be unable to explain the irrational, evil, and contradictory elements of the world. For it can, of course, be urged that, in making Reason all, he fell into an unscientific dogmatism. From consciousness as starting-point of his idealism, he passed to that of the Absolute implied in his philosophy of identity.

Freedom and necessity he sees to be harmonized in God, the absolute synthesis, the identity of the ideal and the real. An infinite process to him is the development of the absolute synthesis. But, again, Schelling's æstheticism finds God really revealed only in art—for him the true religion. The spirit of his teaching may be best gathered from words of his own: "If art is to imitate nature, it has to follow in the wake of the creative power of nature, and not merely slowly to take up architectonically the empty scaffolding of its external forms, and to transfer an equally empty picture of them upon the canvas. It was only for the deep-thinking Grecians, who everywhere felt the trace of the living and working essence, that nature could present many true gods. If we look at things, not with reference to the essence which they contain, but with reference to their empty form, they will not communicate anything to our mind or heart." Art, then, is for Schelling the first revelation of the infinite, in which we are still far from having blended the objectivity of art with the subjectivity of religion.

But Schelling's development presses on to the philosophy of identity; hitherto he has been seeking to overcome Fichtean dualism; he is now centered upon the problem of the Absolute, for solving which man must have intellectual intuition. Such intellectual intuition Schelling believed to be necessary, to save

us from narrow subjectivity; and possible, because the Absolute itself dwells in us as essence of our soul. The intuiting self is identical with the intuited or perceived: in the moment of intuition we are not in time, but time — or rather pure, absolute eternity — is in us; with this intellectual intuition, Schelling seeks to know God, the deepest essence of the world, who is also One. This All-One, whom we call God, has knowledge as his form or eternal being: absolute identity is God's essence and form in synchronous fashion.

By the way of philosophical construction, that is, by means of intellectual intuition, Schelling hoped to attain certainty; but it is clear, on scrutinizing it, that this can never become a method of scientific cognition.

God is Reason, in whom all things are comprehended and perfected, so that Reason is already — anticipatory, that is to say, of Hegel — the essence of the world. The Divine unity is, for Schelling, a really existent unity; undifferentiated activity gives way before the abstract monism of a pure unmoved identity; the self-revelation of God is his existence; things then become so many potences, with the absolute identity as their basis; the sum of these potences is the being of the absolute identity — the All, for he is the only real, outside of whom is nothing.

Schelling's philosophy of nature does not provide for any creation of objects, in the ordinary sense of creation. The Schellingian pantheism required the identity of the absolute and the creature to be preserved, so that the absolute must itself enter into the finite, and be immanent in it. The common postulation of an eternal spirit first, then a material world consciously created or produced by it, is by him reversed — matter being to him first and spirit supervening with growing subjectiveness, until pure and perfect ideality is reached, but such spirit, in this late sense, not being Creator of the world. In this way infinite nature came to objectivize itself in its own perfected works. The Absolute is, in all the real products of nature, identical with these, its products — identical with the material world. The real and the ideal are, in the Absolute, identical; the subject

and the object, nature and spirit, are identical in the Absolute; and it is through intellectual intuition that we recognize this identity. For Schelling the function of all philosophy is to evolve nature from intelligence or intelligence out of nature. Hegel showed Schelling's system of identity to be but logic, and not concerned with reality.

We are now upon Schelling's pantheistic conception of Deity, in which God and the universe are only two sides or aspects of one and the same thing. God becomes an abstraction, and the world is nothing in particular! But the result was too complete, and led to that study of the rise of the finite out of the infinite, and of the phenomenon of evil, which ended in Schelling's acceptance of theism, of Divine Personality, and of real revelation.

We have seen men of genius and artistic power to be, in Schelling's view, endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition, which discerns the identity of the One with the All. Such "intellectual intuition" is, for him, "the organ of all transcendental thinking," for this latter aims "to transform into its own object" what is otherwise "no object," so that, in the result, "the producing of the object and the perceiving are absolutely one." The ego itself is such an intuition, such ego being principle of all reality. The sole organ of transcendental philosophizing is, in his view, the "inner sense," whose object is of such a nature that it never can become the object of external intuition. His Absolute is the indifference of real and ideal, of the subjective and the objective. Nature is, to Schelling, really the Absolute, but we have seen how he moved away from conceptual problems to living ones.

In matter, as the simplest form in which the Absolute appears in nature, the real is the predominating element. Its ideal element is pure force within, or rather, the synthesis of two opposite forces, attraction and repulsion. This ideal element or factor gradually overcomes the comparatively inert mass, through light and life, and various dynamic laws come into play. The formative impulse in nature presses on to higher forms in a progressive development. But it is the "eternally unconscious" which is, for him, root of all intelligence, law, and order.

It is, however, one of the fine features of Schelling that the unity of science and the unity of life are focused in him; for, while he attaches himself to the study of the special sciences, he at the same time seeks to construct, or construe out of their essence, their highest principle, namely, the Absolute. Existence is, to Schelling, self-activity, and nature is already self-activity before she arrives at self-consciousness; for nature, to him, is in herself absolute self-movement. Matter is the root of all things — is existence in its first form; but it is still only the unity, or the polar tension of powers or factors which are active in opposite directions. Nature or the universal essence does not stop short without potentiating itself into life. For an actual ground must be an active one, and the stage of pure potency must be overpassed. But the obscurity and indeterminateness of Schelling's treatment make one ask whether, in all the foregoing processes, identity and indifference are preserved?

God is not God of the dead, but of the living, to this richest of the three great speculative thinkers, from whom we set out, in ideas, intuitions, and variety of directions in which he has supplied stimuli. Schelling's thought proceeds in no constant and unvarying direction: his world-view is set to changes of severest type; he thinks such changes are the necessary supplementings of all earlier positions. The World-soul is to him the principle of life. The acceptance of a conscious, actively purposeful Creator raises philosophy in his view. But in a breaking away, a spring (*Sprung*), or falling away from this Creator, does he find the origin of the sense-world, God himself developing through the world, in its historically claimed independence of Him and return to Him.

Teleology in nature was, however, for him only of an unconscious kind. Every organization seemed to him an unconscious purposive product. Schelling's psychology holds nothing to be real save the will, and regards its own psychological function to be to start from the primal will found in nature, and follow the different stages of knowledge up to the active understanding and the practical reason. 'Tis a merit of his to avoid the mistake of Spinoza and others who make of the universe a fact, or a con-

catenation of facts, while it is really a life. To Schelling, the life of humanity is seen typified or symbolized in nature, wherein spirit has found expression earlier than in man. Schelling, in making man thus an evolution of nature, was reversing the method of Fichte. Schelling's constructive idealism sought to free Fichtean idealism from the arbitrary aspects of the life of finite selves, by providing a theory of the facts of nature, and of the evolution of consciousness, that should be complementary to Fichtean thought. The outer world, then, was a manifestation of spirit, to which outer or natural order the inner world of the ego is inevitably related. These two sciences — mind and nature — Schelling expressly maintains, need and supplement each other, and he declares that a perfect intellectualizing or spiritualizing the laws of nature into laws of thinking or intuition would be "the highest perfecting of the science of nature." For "that theory of nature," he says, "would have attained to perfectness, by virtue of which all nature would resolve itself into intelligence." Man is but nature's last and highest reflection.

The successive stages of phenomenal existence, from nature's lowest forms up to the highest manifestations of life and thought, where sensibility reigns supreme in man, are set forth by means of Schelling's notable — and, it must be said, suggestive — doctrine of potences. All three moments of the Absolute are present, in pursuance of the principles of his theory of identity, in every phenomenon, and all are organic in the end. Man is the sum and content of all the potences. Mechanical and chemical forces are but negative conditions of life: they await vital stimulus that lies exterior to the individual; such is the result of the absolute productivity, which works under the universal law of polarity. "Universal nature," is, for him, common principle of organic and inorganic.

It was here that the defect of Schelling's treatment of the Absolute appeared. Berkeley and Fichte had seen — the former that there is no object without a subject, the latter that, in this sense, the subject makes the object; but Schelling saw that neither can there be a subject without an object — that the objective world equally conditions the existence of the ego. For him,

that is to say, the universe has an existence of its own relatively distinct from the thinking subject. This is not to say, however, that the non-ego, in his view, makes the ego — that sense-perception is constitutive of thought, as with Hume, Locke, Condillac.

There is something finely suggestive in the way Schelling asks how the system of nature can be given to us, and does not blindly content himself with the scientific mode of accepting nature as something immediately given. His deeper quest was to know how the system arose for us, and how we are able to perceive it. His dynamic atomism pierced to forces, and was not content with brute facts. But dynamism, endowed with reason or intelligence to a quite fantastical degree, was what formed his philosophy of nature.

But Schelling leaves nature, with her bi-polar laws, standing like an independent entity over against mind, with her bi-polar categories, in unresolved antagonism. This unresolved task was taken up by Hegel, who identified the Absolute with the process itself. Schelling's worlds of mind and matter were supported by the Absolute, who seemed — according to the well-known saying of Hegel — in Schelling's system shot out of a pistol. Schelling, that is to say, does not show why it is there, or what it is, when he ought to have gone on to unify his bi-polar aspects of the world, relating them to an Absolute Being as a primal cause, and deducing their different natures as due to necessary consequences of evolving principles that latently inhered in such originative cause. Schelling's Absolute remains outside of things, if only for the reason that they proceed from Him. His absolute reason was to mean an equilibrium or indifference of subject and object. But if these two coincide in such a blank identity, the absolute unity becomes reduced to empty form or nothingness. Such an Absolute can give no substantial unity, neither can it subserve any purposes of real explanation. His Absolute was to be the center of indifference of the magnet, but the magnet is no magnet at all, for since, by polar logic, subject and object must first be eliminated ere we reach the Absolute as point of indifference, we are reduced to blank nothingness in the process, and never reach a conscious knowledge of the Absolute at all.

It need not be denied that there was something of freedom, and something of elevation, in Schelling's conception of pure and infinite Being as the absolute indifference; but the subject and object, annulled in the process, are never again methodically developed from that indifference. This mode of thinking was characteristic of Schelling's earlier system. This annihilation of consciousness scarcely seems a promising foundation for philosophy; the Absolute is the middle point of the magnet, the center where there ceases to be any difference between the opposing poles of the real and the ideal; the knowledge of the Absolute which he brings us is a recognition of the essential identity and indifference of all things. In its purely pantheistic stage, the main — however variously estimated — service rendered by Schelling's philosophy, was this assertion of the identity of thought and being, this finding of the key to the problem how the ideal world of consciousness and the real world of being should correspond, and come into commerce with each other. Thought and being, the ideal and the real, are to him identical; all activity and movement of the world of appearance are mere *Schein* of the absolute unity.

In Schelling's Absolute there is a dark, irrational ground, which has to be purified, developmentally, ere Personal Being is reached; there is for him something in God which may, no doubt, become God, but is not God. God must have the ground of existence within himself, says Schelling, since nothing exists before or without God; but Schelling does not take this ground to be God, absolutely considered, that is to say, in so far as He exists. But if the world were taken, he says, to be different from God, then would the world have arisen from a ground different from God; but, as nothing can exist outside the Absolute, the solution of the contradiction is to be found, in his view, in the world having its ground in that original ground which is also the ground of the Divine Existence. This ground — or absolute potency — cannot be resolved, but remains as the ground, "the incomprehensible basis of reality."

Naturally, the ascending powers, which are so prominent a feature of his philosophy of nature, are of great consequence in

such a system. In that philosophy, as we have seen, the concept of powers and the concept of polarity have fundamental places. His metaphysical idealism draws largely upon analogy; and indeed the philosopher of Romanticism goes so far as to put his own symbolic expositions of nature before the painful searchings of science into the real and reciprocal interconnection of phenomena.

It was his distorted conception of philosophic function — in which Fichte and Hegel in their own ways sinned along with him — that led Schelling to construct nature in his *a priori* fashion, with a fine scorn for the blind and senseless natural science that was everywhere establishing itself since the destruction of philosophy by Bacon and of physics by Boyle and Newton! Having originally claimed nature and spirit to be fundamentally one, Schelling later declared the ground of nature and spirit, the Absolute, to be “the identity of the real and the ideal.” The doctrine of identity is thus added to the philosophies of nature and spirit, this philosophy of identity forming indeed their basis. Hence the world-ground is neither nature nor spirit, but the unity of both, rather the indifference of subjective and objective, in which the self-identity of the Absolute is never lost. Such was the goal to which Schelling’s thought had traveled from the time when he extolled nature as source of spirit — as, in fact, undeveloped and unconscious intelligence. He had exalted nature to the position of subject, and only from creative nature — *natura naturans* — comes the ego, in this reversion of Fichtean procedure. Nature being to Schelling *a priori*, he thinks we can philosophically construct it anew.

It was his favoring poetical symbolism as a mode of interpretation that made it a more natural result that he should give art the supreme place. But, alike in his teachings and in his want of proper method, Schelling showed himself to be marked by the arbitrariness and lawlessness which were so characteristic of Romanticism.

Schelling does not fail to deal, in his so-called positive philosophy, with the problem of freedom, in relation to good and evil: evil for him arises out of the striving of the individual will against

the universal will; man is, for him, free creative activity, and, as such, the essence of the world; his doctrine of freedom, indeed, is marked by insight into the metaphysical essence of the world, but tends to approximate to the irrationalism of Schopenhauer. God at length becomes to Schelling life and personality, not an abstraction; He is becoming and development, not static being; the essence of the world is will, as primary being, though only presaging and unconscious. In the last and highest instance, he insists that there is no existence save willing, which is original existence, self-affirmed and independent of time. Thus the necessities of the ethical life came to influence Schelling's thought more than abstract speculation.

The positive essence of freedom, says Schelling, consists in this, that it is a faculty of good and of evil, so proving the greatest difficulty in philosophy; for he thinks "it is impossible to understand how a faculty for evil can follow from God"; hence "the derivation of human liberty from God cannot be a correct one, but it must, at least in as far as it is a faculty for evil, have a root independent from God." Schelling does not content himself with making freedom the principle of moral action, but regards it as also the principle of consciousness, so making it the common principle of theoretic and of practical philosophy. Nor does he fail to notice an irrational and contingent element in the world, especially in the sphere of organic life. But Schelling is not sufficiently careful to keep the irrationality of individual wills from being, by any possibility, grounded in the last resort in irrationality of the Absolute Will. His philosophy of religion — with its personal God, its freedom, and its individual immortality — is of merely negative value. All birth is, for Schelling, birth out of darkness into light; the process of creation is an inner transmutation of the original principle of darkness into light.

If we desire the dark ground, which is the common root of Deity and the world, to be brought nearer to us, then says Schelling — speaking now as characteristic philosopher of Romanticism — we shall find it to consist of something which is essentially longing — longing to give birth to itself. Man does not at first perceive that he is not really separate from the Absolute, that he

is himself an integral part of the Infinite Power, but this identity ever grows in its hold upon him, the infinite spirit acting in him by the different gradations of revelation.

Man has, as we have seen, two principles in him, wherein consists for him the possibility of evil or of good, as he unites himself to the Universal Will or not. But one must recall in this connection that human individuality is a quite insufficient basis for morality, and that it should be realized that moral justification is found for such conceptions as individuality and personality only as they are grounded or set in the universal-human. Schelling came to see that the key to the world's enigma must be found in no categories of nature, but in ethical categories of freedom. What he did not realize was that perfect freedom of the human personality implies that it shall be regarded, as little as possible, as a mere means of divine purpose, and be rather viewed as having end and worth in itself.

Schelling's theism is by no means of a kind that is free from contradictions, when taken as a complete world-view. It does by no means consort well with his pessimistic world-conception. He postulates an immediate, intuitive, and individual knowledge of the Absolute in man, but overlooks that this knowledge is not on all fours with the knowledge which the Absolute itself has. The speculative theism of his later thought was meant to give depth to his originally pure pantheism, while the pure rationalism of his earlier thought was supplemented, later, by a higher empiricism. His later thought made the Divine Personality consist simply in the living unity of the Real and the Ideal — a position not so free from arbitrariness as to be quite easy to justify. The abstract, empty unity, of which his Absolute originally consisted, needed and received from him modification, in respect of the production of the world's multiplicity. In fact, no one presses on more than Schelling from empty speculation to an inquiring comprehension of reality. The irrationalities, discords, oppositions, found in nature and history, are, to Schelling, necessary in order to life. There can be no real unity in his view without such conflict. For only thus does substance first become living, intelligent, willing, active. For the unity

of personal being, even in Deity, he must needs postulate an original antithesis in the Absolute. This new mode of conceiving Deity, though interesting and suggestive, does not really carry us far, since the conflict or opposition is entirely within Deity's own nature.

Schelling failed to realize that our individual consciousness can perceive only the ready products of the activity of the Absolute, never the precedent producing activity itself. Indeed, it is with the products that our consciousness itself has its rise. Schelling's method has need of an infusion of inductive method, which infers the transcendent in backward fashion from the perceivable. This, however, he came at length to perceive, through the proved insufficiency of the "intellectual intuition." The development of Schelling's thought was steadily from an abstract, æsthetic world-view to a living and ethical one.

In his later philosophy, Schelling begins his ontology with the indeterminate idea of the possibility of becoming (*Seinkönnen*), from which the critical and gradual separation of the ambiguous and indeterminate will educe the true concept of God, which, to Schelling, is that God is the Lord of Being. God was, to him, the Original Possibility of Being; the science of reason shows Him to be the *natura necessaria* — existent in nature or concept, and not merely possible. A still subjectively-thought existence only for Deity; but reason so encloses Him that He is not to be held as essentially so enclosed — in fact, it must postulate Him as actually existing. These ontological suggestions or contentions have been unduly overshadowed by those of Hegel, superior as these latter, even with their exaggerated form, may be. Schelling's theistic conceptions are very unsatisfying, for he holds that God first comes to consciousness in man. In the final stage of Schelling's conceptions of Deity, we find him holding to personality-pantheism, in which all being is God's being, and three personalities are postulated as in Deity. The three potences of his "rational philosophy" are, the negative, the positive, and the harmonization of these two. It was to Schelling — as to Fichte — the task of theoretic philosophy, to give a history of self-consciousness. For him "that which is posited *out of*

consciousness is, in its essence, the same as that which is posited *in* consciousness," and so "the knowable must itself bear the impress of the knower." Schelling's philosophy of nature one-sidedly fails to bring out that man's consciousness is not merely consciousness of nature, but is also consciousness of itself, and of its own knowledge. The I, in its self-consciousness, must be held to have other contents than merely that of nature.

It was the principle of his philosophy that brought Schelling to his æsthetic standpoint. He held to two forms of activity in the Absolute: the world of nature sprang out of an infinite, unconscious, necessary activity of the Absolute, while morality was the product of its free, conscious, purposeful activity. The objective world was, for him, only the original, but unconscious poesy of the spirit. The philosophy of Art was the universal organum of philosophy—the keystone of its whole arch—in Schelling's view. To him the idealistic world of art, and the real world objects, are products of one and the same activity.

"But if we are to apprehend it," says Schelling, "as living, the essence must, in its form, not only present itself to us, in general, as active principle, but also as spirit and as science, which realizes itself in its works. Every unity can only be spiritual both in its mode and in its origin, and what else is the aim of every investigation of nature, if it is not to find science in it?" "True, the science by which nature works is not one similar to human science, which is immediately connected with reflection upon itself. No; in the former the idea is not distinct from the act, nor the plan from the execution." Every work of art is, to Schelling, properly the product of genius, purposed yet created, and achieved as by miracle. The work of freedom, it is yet prompted as by nature's necessity, so that conscious and unconscious action here coincide.

The coincidence or meeting together of conscious and unconscious activity yields the real—without consciousness, and—with consciousness—the æsthetic world. Schelling takes man to be that wherein is first found the highest form of beauty: the beauty of the soul is for him the highest signification of nature. He enriched æsthetics at many individual points; his changing

æsthetical interests are seen in the three main periods of his philosophic life; the first, in which his art-philosophy is brought into being in his transcendental idealism; the second, in which it appears, broadly developed, in his system of identity; and the third, in which it is marked by theosophic thinness. In the first of these periods Schelling opposed what had been the one-sided moralism of Fichte, who raised Kant's transcendental unity of apperception to the position of a metaphysical essence — the absolutely producing I. Thereby nature, as the product, was left as a mere means or transitional stage, in the confirmation of this I. Schelling, without being conscious of the fact, adopted what had been the view of Leibniz, that all nature is *Ichheit*.

So far from treating æsthetics as mere passage to morality, Schelling made the artistic point of view the controlling one in his whole philosophy of the objective. Nature is extolled by him as an original creative power, and his view ran on into the period of his system of identity, with its equal positing of the subjective and objective elements — will and knowledge. His attempts at knowing and comprehending the unity of the subjective and the objective were various; at one time as the unity of positive productivity and negative conditions, in his philosophy of nature; at another time as abstraction of the objective, in his transcendental idealism; at yet another time as the most original unity, in his system of identity. In the last and most original opposition of active will and passive idea, the world-process tends to appear as a triumph of light or idea over blind and dark will.

If we take so recent a work as Professor Laurie's *Synthetica*, one finds in it not a little that is suggestive of the influence of Schelling. Laurie says "the system of which we form a part is irrational." The irrational element, which figures in Schelling's philosophy, is that which gives it a certain realistic tinge. And yet the system must be taken as idealistic, since in it the universe exists only in thought, thought being but the universal nature in its developmental process, wherein, after all attempts at objectivization, it returns into identity with itself as pure subject. The irrational element is significant, too, of a certain reactionary tendency in Schelling against speculative philosophy, as not with-

out limit, or as marked by inability to reach its final goal. Hence the lingering dualism in Schelling's idealism; his identity doctrine is too abstract and formal; the differences are not really and finally harmonized. Indeed, idealistic as we may admit his system to be, the difficulties as to a coherent world-theory were so great as to work in him an unconscious transition to (an epistemological) transcendental realism. Idealism is the soul of philosophy, he says, realism its body; and it takes these two to make a living whole.

The boldness of Schelling's claim for speculative construction, as able to reach beyond empiric limits, and disclose the inner type of all things, one cannot choose but admire, yet one is, of course, compelled to admit how little nature can be reduced to true unity save by that severe and earnest scientific study of reciprocal and interconnected forces and phenomena which Schelling, in his arbitrariness, undervalued. Yet the fact is not without significance that we have scientists today like Sir Oliver Lodge, Lloyd Morgan and others, who seem disposed to take idealistic interpretations as more ultimate than those yielded by science itself. For any realism must avail but little whose external world is not one revealed in experience.

So, too, his evolutionary theory was not realistic enough to face an actual transition of one power into another, instead of each form springing directly out of the infinite productivity itself. Matter was, to Schelling, slumbering spirit, and the evolution he presents to us, in the sphere of reality, is the evolution of the Absolute. But Schelling was idealist enough to hold to the ideality of space and time—space, as such, being nothing real, and time only inner sense becoming, to its own self, object. For Schelling, philosophy's progress is seen first in mythology, and then in revelation.

The evolution of the God-idea in history is traced by him so as to show a passing from pantheism or monotheism to polytheism, and thence to the triune God of revelation. But for him the world's history is just God coming to Himself, and our longing for the actual God is what constitutes religion. With Jacob Boehme, he makes the Absolute the *Urgrund*, the essence prior to all duality, to all ground or existence.

To Schelling's philosophy of nature and transcendental idealism, there has been no nearer approach than Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, and Hartmann has sought to bring out the merits of Schelling's metaphysical system. It was a merit, certainly, in Schelling that, to his earlier purely rationalistic philosophy, he added a supplementary positive philosophy, in which freedom and divine will and action are present in more satisfying ways than those which had made the Absolute become personal in man.

Schelling's philosophy shared too largely the weaknesses and limitations of his time to be capable of adoption today, but that does not keep it from being calculated to kindle speculative power anew, to supply weighty thoughts for the healing of the disunion between pantheism and theism, between science and religion, and to point the way to some better world-view of our own making.

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